Virtual/remote IT audits
- I am performing
virtual/remote FFIEC IT
audits for banks and credit unions.
I am a former
bank examiner with years of IT auditing experience.
Please contact R. Kinney Williams at
examiner@yennik.com from your bank's email and I will send you
information and fees. All correspondence is
confidential.
FYI - Mobile banking boom presents new risk, security
concerns - Already on the rise, mobile-based financial services have
spiked in the past 18 months due to the COVID-19-related lockdowns
and service limitations.
https://www.scmagazine.com/analysis/mobile/mobile-banking-boom-presents-new-risk-security-concerns
CMMC overhaul to change cybersecurity requirements for defense
contractors - A pair of new federal regulations that were posted —
and then withdrawn — from the Federal Register Thursday could bring
significant changes to the Department of Defense’s Cybersecurity
Maturity Model Certification program.
https://www.scmagazine.com/analysis/policy/cmmc-overhaul-to-change-cybersecurity-requirements-for-defense-contractors
Qualys CEO explains how infrastructure-as-code may be the key to
tackling cloud misconfigurations - Looking to make it easier for
security teams to detect and remediate misconfigurations early in
the development cycle, Qualys this week announced that it would add
infrastructure as code (IaC) scanning to its CloudView app.
https://www.scmagazine.com/analysis/cloud-security/qualys-ceo-explains-how-infrastructure-as-code-may-be-the-key-to-tackling-cloud-misconfigurations
CSA Medical Device Incident Response Playbook - This document
presents a best-practices medical device incident response playbook
that incorporates clinical aspects of medical device IR.
https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/artifacts/csa-medical-device-incident-response-playbook/
Should companies subject employees to ransomware-specific security
training? - A ransomware attack represents one the most serious
cyberthreat scenarios an organization can face, with its own unique
set of prevention and response challenges. And yet, a new survey
suggests that ransomware-specific security awareness training
programs remain relatively uncommon.
https://www.scmagazine.com/analysis/ransomware/should-companies-subject-employees-to-ransomware-specific-security-training
The fight against ransomware calls for a new backup strategy - When
ransomware shut down Colonial Pipeline in May, after a week of
deliberating the company finally gave in and paid the ransom.
https://www.scmagazine.com/perspective/backup-and-recovery/the-fight-against-ransomware-calls-for-a-new-backup-strategy
ATTACKS, INTRUSIONS, DATA THEFT & LOSS
FYI - Popular 'coa' NPM library hijacked to steal user
passwords - Popular npm library 'coa' was hijacked today with
malicious code injected into it, ephemerally impacting React
pipelines around the world.
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/popular-coa-npm-library-hijacked-to-steal-user-passwords/
US defense contractor Electronic Warfare hit by data breach - US
defense contractor Electronic Warfare Associates (EWA) has disclosed
a data breach after threat actors hacked their email system and
stole files containing personal information.
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/us-defense-contractor-electronic-warfare-hit-by-data-breach/
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of the newsletter
WEB SITE COMPLIANCE -
We continue covering
some of the issues discussed in the "Risk Management Principles for
Electronic Banking" published by the Basel Committee on Bank
Supervision.
Board and
Management Oversight -
Principle 5: Banks should use transaction authentication methods
that promote non-repudiation and establish accountability for
e-banking transactions.
Non-repudiation involves creating proof of the origin or
delivery of electronic information to protect the sender against
false denial by the recipient that the data has been received, or to
protect the recipient against false denial by the sender that the
data has been sent. Risk of transaction repudiation is already an
issue with conventional transactions such as credit cards or
securities transactions. However, e-banking heightens this risk
because of the difficulties of positively authenticating the
identities and authority of parties initiating transactions, the
potential for altering or hijacking electronic transactions, and the
potential for e-banking users to claim that transactions were
fraudulently altered.
To address these heightened concerns, banks need to make
reasonable efforts, commensurate with the materiality and type of
the e-banking transaction, to ensure that:
1) E-banking systems are designed to reduce the likelihood that
authorized users will initiate unintended transactions and that
customers fully understand the risks associated with any
transactions they initiate.
2) All parties to the transaction are positively authenticated
and control is maintained over the authenticated channel.
3) Financial transaction data are protected from alteration and
any alteration is detectable.
Banking organizations have begun to employ various techniques
that help establish non-repudiation and ensure confidentiality and
integrity of e-banking transactions, such as digital certificates
using public key infrastructure (PKI). A bank may issue a digital
certificate to a customer or counterparty to allow for their unique
identification/authentication and reduce the risk of transaction
repudiation. Although in some countries customers' rights to
disclaim transactions is provided in specific legal provisions,
legislation has been passed in certain national jurisdictions making
digital signatures legally enforceable. Wider global legal
acceptance of such techniques is likely as technology continues to
evolve.
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the top of the newsletter
FFIEC IT SECURITY -
We continue our series on the FFIEC
interagency Information Security Booklet.
SECURITY CONTROLS -
IMPLEMENTATION -
NETWORK ACCESS
Network security requires effective implementation of several
control mechanisms to adequately secure access to systems and data.
Financial institutions must evaluate and appropriately implement
those controls relative to the complexity of their network. Many
institutions have increasingly complex and dynamic networks stemming
from the growth of distributed computing.
Security personnel and network administrators have related but
distinct responsibilities for ensuring secure network access across
a diverse deployment of interconnecting network servers, file
servers, routers, gateways, and local and remote client
workstations. Security personnel typically lead or assist in the
development of policies, standards, and procedures, and monitor
compliance. They also lead or assist in incident-response efforts.
Network administrators implement the policies, standards, and
procedures in their day-to-day operational role.
Internally, networks can host or provide centralized access to
mission-critical applications and information, making secure access
an organizational priority. Externally, networks integrate
institution and third-party applications that grant customers and
insiders access to their financial information and Web-based
services. Financial institutions that fail to restrict access
properly expose themselves to increased transaction, reputation, and
compliance risk from threats including the theft of customer
information, data alteration, system misuse, or denial-of-service
attacks.
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NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS
AND TECHNOLOGY -
We continue
the series on the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) Handbook.
Chapter 17 - LOGICAL ACCESS CONTROL
17.1.3 Location
Access to particular system resources may also be based upon
physical or logical location. For example, in a prison, all users in
areas to which prisoners are physically permitted may be limited to
read-only access. Changing or deleting is limited to areas to which
prisoners are denied physical access. The same authorized users
(e.g., prison guards) would operate under significantly different
logical access controls, depending upon their physical location.
Similarly, users can be restricted based upon network addresses
(e.g., users from sites within a given organization may be permitted
greater access than those from outside).
17.1.4 Time
Time-of-day or day-of-week restrictions are common limitations on
access. For example, use of confidential personnel files may be
allowed only during normal working hours -- and maybe denied before
8:00 a.m. and after 6:00 p.m. and all day during weekends and
holidays.
17.1.5 Transaction
Another approach to access control can be used by organizations
handling transactions (e.g., account inquiries). Phone calls may
first be answered by a computer that requests that callers key in
their account number and perhaps a PIN. Some routine transactions
can then be made directly, but more complex ones may require human
intervention. In such cases, the computer, which already knows the
account number, can grant a clerk, for example, access to a
particular account for the duration of the transaction. When
completed, the access authorization is terminated. This means that
users have no choice in which accounts they have access to, and can
reduce the potential for mischief. It also eliminates employee
browsing of accounts (e.g., those of celebrities or their neighbors)
and can thereby heighten privacy.
17.1.6 Service Constraints
Service constraints refer to those restrictions that depend upon
the parameters that may arise during use of the application or that
are preestablished by the resource owner/manager. For example, a
particular software package may only be licensed by the organization
for five users at a time. Access would be denied for a sixth user,
even if the user were otherwise authorized to use the application.
Another type of service constraint is based upon application content
or numerical thresholds. For example, an ATM machine may restrict
transfers of money between accounts to certain dollar limits or may
limit maximum ATM withdrawals to $500 per day. Access may also be
selectively permitted based on the type of service requested. For
example, users of computers on a network may be permitted to
exchange electronic mail but may not be allowed to log in to each
others' computers. |